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1Asymmetric Information in 
Defense Acquisition:




Why Information Asymmetries 
and Bid Protests?
• Information Aggregation
– Information decentralized across DoD and contractors
– DoD should gather and aggregate information
• Update preferences – FEAR OF PROTESTS
• Information Revelation
– DoD has good a priori information
– DoD should reveal its information to the contractors
• Update preferences – FEAR OF PROTESTS
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3Objectives
• Examine asymmetric information in defense procurement
– Scenario 1:  DoD’s possess imperfect information; information is 
decentralized across contractors
– Scenario 2:  Information is centralized within DoD; DoD decides what 
to distribute across contractors
• Model asymmetric information environments and 
characterize implications
– Iterated Information Aggregation Auction (I2A2) Mechanism
– Centralized Information Multi-attribute Contracting Model
• Examine implications of the asymmetric information models 

















Vendor (Agent) Protest Choice Problem
• Profit from Protest 
= Expected Benefits – Expected Costs
• Expected Benefits 
= Prob (merit)*Prob (Sustained/Merit)* 
Contract Revenues
• Expected Costs 
= Search & Information + Legal + Reputation 
+ Opportunity Costs
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DoD (Principal) Governance Mechanisms
• Reduce Profit from Protest 
– Expected Benefits – Expected Costs
• Reduce Expected Benefits 
– Lower Probability (Merit) and Probability 
(Sustained) 
– Reduce Revenues
• Increase Expected Costs 
– Raise: Search & Information, Legal, Reputation, 
Opportunity Costs
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Increase Expected Costs 
• Raise: Search & Information, Legal, Reputation, 
Opportunity Costs
– Charge a protest fee that reflects DoD’s transaction costs 
from a protest
• Schedule delays; lapse in performance coverage; program cost 
overruns, etc.
– Adopt UK court’s principle that loser pays…
• Unsuccessful protestors pay court costs and compensation
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• Lower Probability Merit and Sustained
– Carefully document decision process
– Better educate procurement teams
– Specify desired characteristics/attributes but not weights
– Solicit GAO “Seal of Approval”
• Reduce Revenues
– Provide more chances to win contract
• Unbundle complex integrated contracts
• Shared awards; variable shares based on proposal evaluation
– Firms earn reputation of being protestors
Reduce Expected Benefits
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Risks of Limiting Protests
• Bidders may raise their prices/bids to compensate
• Bidders may lower quality/performance/schedule 
outcomes to compensate
• Bidders may drop out reducing competition
• Reduces Transparency and Accountability of 
Acquisition Process
• Risk Trade-off : Performance, Cost & Schedule
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LOGCAP IV – Evaluation
• Awards based on best value to the government, 
considering the evaluation factors of management, 
past performance, technical (scenario) &cost/price
• Management evaluation “moderately” more 
important than past performance & technical factors
• Past performance & technical factors “moderately”
more important than final cost/price estimates.
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Asymmetric Information in 
Defense Procurement
• DoD is uncertain about relevant attribute weights
– Contractors have better tradeoff information 
– Incentive to sway DoD’s preferences in their favor 
– DoD wants to aggregate decentralized trade-off information
• DoD has a priori preferences over relevant weights
– DoD doesn’t specify (all) weights to avoid contractor protests
• Contractors face a lower probability of winning a protest




DoD Uncertain About Attribute Weights
• True value of procured product/service depends on:
– Performance along various attributes (A1, A2, A3, …)
• Aircraft example: Speed, maneuverability, range, reliability, etc.
– Relative importance/weighting of each attribute (α1, α2, α3, …)
• Information about appropriate weights incomplete, diffuse, and private
⇒Value = α1A1 + α2A1 + α3A1 +  … - P
• Ex ante information (before bids or announcements):
– DoD and contractors have incomplete and independent information 
about optimal attribute weighting
• Precision of information reflected in number of “draws from an urn”
• DoD may have more, less, or same precision as any contractor




– Actual Weight= .6
– 68% of random observations within one standard 
deviation of mean
Draws 2 4 6 8 10 15 20
1 STD ±.346 ±.245 ±.200 ±.173 ±.155 ±.126 ±.110
+ 1 STD 0.946 0.845 0.800 0.773 0.755 0.726 0.710
-1 STD 0.254 0.355 0.400 0.427 0.445 0.474 0.490
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Single Auction Alternatives
1) Publish (optional): DoD publishes its own estimates of weights
2) Auction: Each contractor submits bid based on own estimates and 
(perhaps) DoD estimates of weights
3) Update (optional): DoD updates its own estimates of weights based on 
contractor bids
4) Award: Winning contractor selected based on (possibly) updated weights
Two optional stages create four single auction variations:
─ No Publish, No Update ─ Publish, No Update





I2A2:  Iterated Information 
Aggregation Auction
1) Initial auction: Each contractor submits bid (M1, M2, M3, …, P) 
based on own estimates of weights (α1, α2, α3, …)
2) Update: DoD updates its estimates of appropriate weights based on 
contractor bids and announces new estimates
3) Elimination: Contractors with least value initial bids (according to 
updated weights) are eliminated
4) Final auction: Each remaining contractor submits a new bid based 
on updated weights


































































• Procurement mechanisms can be designed that:
– Create incentives for actors to truthfully reveal
information
– Efficiently aggregate diverse and often conflicting 
information
– Identify optimal choices based on aggregated 
information
• Updating requirements and evaluation criteria significantly 
increases DoD’s value
– Carefully designing how we procure can help determine 
what to procure, from whom and at what price
A Priori DoD Preferences – Weights Specified(?)
• True value of procured product/service depends on:
– Performance along ten attributes (A1, A2, A3, … , A10 )
• Aircraft example: Speed, maneuverability, range, reliability, etc.
– Relative importance/weighting of each attribute (α1, α2, α3, … , α10 )
• DoD has a priori values for attribute weights
• Contractor information about appropriate weights incomplete
⇒Value = α1A1 + α2A2 + α3A3 +  … + α10A10 – P
• DoD reveals weights for some/all attributes
– Withholds information to avoid protests
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Monte Carlo Simulation Model
• DoD announces 0 – 10 attribute weights
– 0% info; 10% info; …; 100% info (11 cases)
• Contractors choose product attributes (2, 4, 6, 8, 10 firms)
– Imperfectly informed for unannounced attributes
• Draws from an urn (2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 15, 20)
– Contractors know their (random) cost functions
• Pj = Cj = a1jA1j + a2jA2j + … + a10jA10j
• Choose A1j, … A10j to maximize: α1jA1j +  … + α10jA10j – Pj
• DoD chooses contractor maximizing DoD value
– Pays to capture value of first excluded contractor
19






































































































































































































• If DoD doesn’t know a priori preferences
– Aggregate information across contractors to improve 
efficiency
• If DoD knows but doesn’t reveal a priori preferences,
– Reduces DoD surplus value
– DoD may reject preferred contractor
– Creates uncertainty
• Reduces expected value of contract protest
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Future Research
• Combine decentralized information and 
revelation models
– DoD’s a priori knowledge varies across attributes
– Revealed preferences can not be updated
• Model tradeoff between expected value of 
protest and DoD inefficiency
• Compare to alternative mechanisms to 
address contract protests
– Split contracts with split based on relative value
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